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 I.  INTRODUCTION  
 
 Nathan and Patricia Rubin, who are husband and wife, 
appeal from an order in these consolidated diversity of 
citizenship cases granting summary judgment to Electric Insurance 
Company and declaring that Electric is not obligated to provide 
coverage under a personal excess liability insurance policy it 
issued to Nathan Rubin for claims made by Patricia Rubin arising 
from an automobile accident on November 7, 1992.  The germane 
facts are not in dispute, and we exercise plenary review on this 
appeal.  Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware 
Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 554 
(1993).  The parties agree that the case is governed by 
Pennsylvania law, which we accordingly apply. 
 The facts are not complicated.  On December 29, 1988, 
Nathan Rubin signed Electric's application for a personal excess 
liability insurance policy, which is sometimes called an umbrella 
policy.  The application was an uncomplicated two-page form which 
identified Nathan Rubin's two automobiles and included an option 
for a $2,000,000 liability limit which he selected.  The 
application included a premium calculated on coverage for a 
residence and two automobiles.  The application, however, did not 
include the terms and conditions of the policy that Electric 
would issue, except insofar as it stated that applicants must 
have underlying liability policies with specified limits 
including, as germane here, $100,000/$300,000 bodily injury 
  
coverage for automobiles.  The insurance was to be effective when 
Electric received the application.   
 Electric subsequently issued the excess policy to 
Nathan Rubin as the named insured with Patricia Rubin being an 
additional insured.  The policy contained a provision that "we do 
not provide Liability Coverage for any insured . . . for personal 
injury to you or your relative."  This provision, however, had 
not been included in the application.  Inasmuch as the policy 
defined "relative" to include a person related to the insured by 
marriage, by its terms the policy did not cover Nathan Rubin for 
claims made by Patricia Rubin.  The policy was renewed annually 
through the issuance of declaration statements.  The premium for 
the policy period from January 18, 1992, until January 18, 1993, 
included a charge of $60.00 for two automobiles, and the total 
premium for that year was $112.50. 
 On November 7, 1992, Nathan Rubin, while driving an 
automobile with Patricia Rubin as a passenger, crashed into a 
parked tractor trailer, causing her to suffer injuries so 
catastrophic that by November 11, 1993, her medical bills were 
$746,489.78.  At the time of the accident, the Rubin automobile 
was insured for basic coverage by Commercial Union Insurance 
Company which has tendered its $100,000 liability policy limits 
and which thus has no further liability obligations.  Obviously, 
Patricia Rubin's claim against Nathan Rubin exceeds the $100,000 
Commercial Union limit, and Nathan Rubin accordingly has called 
on Electric to defend him against his wife's claim.  Electric, 
  
however, citing the exclusion we quote above, has denied 
coverage. 
 As a result of the claim for coverage and the 
disclaimer, the parties started two actions to determine the 
scope of coverage.  Electric brought a declaratory judgment 
action in the district court against the Rubins seeking an order 
that it does not provide liability insurance coverage to Nathan 
Rubin for Patricia Rubin's claim.  Patricia Rubin brought an 
action against Nathan Rubin and Electric in the Court of Common 
Pleas of Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania, seeking a declaration 
that the exclusion is invalid as being against public policy and 
being unenforceable under the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle 
Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL).  Furthermore, Patricia 
Rubin sought an order that Electric must cover Nathan Rubin, as 
it acted in bad faith and violated the Pennsylvania Unfair 
Insurance Practices Act and the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade 
Practices and Consumer Protection Law in its dealings with him.1  
Electric removed Patricia Rubin's action to the district court 
where the two declaratory judgment actions were consolidated.  
 The district court decided the consolidated cases by 
granting Electric's motions for summary judgment in a memorandum 
opinion dated February 17, 1994.  The district court first said 
that it was undisputed that the excess policy excluded coverage 
                     
1
.  We note that the Rubins do not assert that Patricia Rubin 
ever has commenced a tort action against Nathan Rubin to recover 
for her injuries, though Electric in its brief refers to a common 
pleas court action that apparently is such a case. 
  
for Patricia Rubin's claim.  The court then noted that although 
the Rubins contended that the exclusion was against public 
policy, the case which gave the most support for this contention, 
Hack v. Hack, 433 A.2d 859 (Pa. 1981), merely struck down 
interspousal tort immunity in Pennsylvania and did not deal with 
insurance coverage.  The district court then indicated that the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania never has dealt with the validity 
of family exclusions, but the Pennsylvania Superior Court has 
upheld them.  See Neil v. Allstate Ins. Co., 549 A.2d 1304, 1306 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1988), allocatur denied, 549 A.2d 1304 (Pa. 
1989); Paiano v. Home Ins. Co., 385 A.2d 460 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1978).  The district court also observed that federal courts 
applying Pennsylvania law "repeatedly" and "emphatically" have 
upheld family exclusions.  See, e.g., Groff v. State Farm Fire 
and Casualty Co., 646 F. Supp. 973 (E.D. Pa. 1986).  The court 
next held that while the application Nathan Rubin completed for 
the insurance did not contain the exclusion, that omission did 
not matter because the policy which included the exclusion was 
issued and renewed three times before the accident. 
 The district court then acknowledged that the MVFRL 
invalidates family exclusions, but it held, citing Stoumen v. 
Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 834 F. Supp. 140, 143 (E.D. Pa. 
1993), that that interdiction was immaterial because excess 
liability insurance is not governed by the MVFRL.  The district 
court also observed that application of the MVFRL to excess 
policies would change the insurance business in Pennsylvania and 
result in significantly higher premiums for excess coverage.  The 
  
court also pointed out that Nathan Rubin paid only $60.00 for the 
annual coverage for two automobiles, a premium which suggested 
that he was not buying basic coverage.  Finally, the court found 
no reason to hold that Electric had acted in bad faith and no 
basis on which to impose liability under the Unfair Insurance 
Practices Act or the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer 
Protection Law. 
 In view of the district court's conclusions, it entered 
an order in the consolidated cases on February 18, 1994, in favor 
of Electric and against the Rubins.  The Rubins have appealed 
from that order.  We will affirm. 
 
 II.  DISCUSSION 
 The Rubins first argue that Patricia Rubin cannot be 
excluded from coverage predicated on her marital status because 
she was not a party to the insurance agreement.  They support 
this contention by pointing out that in Hack, 433 A.2d 859, the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania "abrogated the defense of inter-
spousal immunity after determining that the various public policy 
considerations that supported the defense were outmoded and 
illogical."  Brief at 15.  They correctly observe that the 
Pennsylvania Insurance Department "specifically relied upon the 
abrogation of interspousal immunity in Hack to preclude insurers 
from excluding intrafamily lawsuits in automobile insurance 
policies."  Id. at 17.  See Memorandum of the Pennsylvania 
Insurance Department dated February 13, 1991.  App. at 428.  
Citing, inter alia, Groff v. Continental Ins. Co., 741 F. Supp. 
  
541 (E.D. Pa. 1990), and the Pennsylvania Unfair Insurance 
Practices Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 40, § 1171.5(a)(7)(iii) 
(1992), the Rubins further contend that Electric could not 
discriminate against Patricia Rubin because of her marital 
status, particularly inasmuch as she was not a party to the 
excess policy.  The Rubins next make the related argument that 
there is no valid policy consideration justifying the enforcement 
of the exclusion. 
 We see no support for these contentions.  It is true 
that in Hack the court concluded "that a tortfeaser's immunity 
from liability because of his marital relationship with the 
injured party cannot be sustained on the basis of law, logic or 
public policy."  433 A.2d 860-61.  Therefore, the court 
"abrogate[d] the judicially-created doctrine of interspousal 
immunity."  Id. at 861.  It is further true that in abrogating 
the immunity, the court pointed out that "family harmony" could 
be promoted by allowing tort actions between spouses in cases in 
which the defendant-spouse "is idemnified by insurance."  Id. at 
866.  Furthermore, we realize that in many situations a 
defendant-spouse will be protected by liability insurance from a 
plaintiff-spouse's tort claims.  Indeed, Nathan Rubin has that 
protection up to the $100,000 coverage supplied by Commercial 
Union.  Nevertheless, Hack simply did not deal with insurance 
coverage issues.  Thus, we cannot conclude that the Hack court 
announced a public policy that an insurance policy, particularly 
an excess policy, could not have an interspousal exclusion. 
  
 The Unfair Insurance Practices Act is not germane to 
the issue before us.  The section on which the Rubins principally 
rely simply precludes "unfair discrimination between individuals 
of the same class and essentially the same hazard with regard to 
underwriting standards and practices or eligibility requirements 
by reason of . . . sex . . . or marital status."  Pa. Stat. Ann. 
tit. 40, § 1171.5(a)(7).  In this case, there has been no  
discrimination of that character, as the exclusion is not 
concerned with "underwriting standards and practices or 
eligibility requirements."  Rather, it deals with the scope of 
coverage which Nathan Rubin purchased. 
 The fact that Patricia Rubin is not a party to the 
policy, though she is an insured under it, is immaterial.  There 
is no reason why an injured person must be a party to an 
insurance policy for the insured to be denied coverage under the 
policy when the injured person makes a claim against him.  This 
is not a situation in which a Pennsylvania statute expressly 
requires that a spouse have coverage for a claim against him by 
his spouse unless the injured spouse waives coverage. 
 In reaching these conclusions, we take particular note 
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's recent opinion in Paylor v. 
Hartford Ins. Co., 640 A.2d 1234 (Pa. 1994).  In Paylor, the 
court upheld the application of the "family car exclusion" which 
barred recovery for underinsured motorists coverage to the estate 
of a decedent from the Hartford Insurance Company.  The decedent 
was killed while a passenger in a motor home driven by her 
husband.  The motor home was insured by Foremost Insurance 
  
Company which paid her estate its liability limits.  The decedent 
and her husband were both named insureds under both policies.  
Clearly, the decedent would have had underinsured coverage under 
the Hartford policy if she simply had been a casual passenger in 
a vehicle owned by some other person to whom she had not been 
related at the time of the accident.   
 While obviously the issue in Paylor is distinguishable 
from that before us, that case is significant because it 
demonstrates that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is unwilling 
to eliminate all limitations on the scope of insurance coverage 
flowing from family relationships.  Paylor is also significant 
because it authoritatively demonstrates the methodology which we 
should apply here.  The court in Paylor indicated that when the 
insurance "policy language is clear and unambiguous, we will give 
effect to the language of the contract."  Id. at 1235.  It then 
indicated that if a policy provision violates public policy, it 
will not be enforced. 
 But the court made it perfectly clear that it will not 
easily find that a provision violates public policy.  Rather, 
"[p]ublic policy is to be ascertained by reference to the laws 
and legal precedents and not from general considerations of 
supposed public interest."  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Accordingly, there are two bases on which a provision 
may violate public policy:  (1) "when a given policy is so 
obviously . . . against the public health, safety, morals or 
welfare that there is a virtual unanimity of opinion . . . that 
[it] is not in accord with public policy"; or (2) when a 
  
provision cannot be enforced "when the courts have interpreted 
statutes broadly to help manifest their legislative intent."  Id.  
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 Application of Paylor really decides this case.  First, 
Paylor tells us to look to the terms of the policy which, as the 
Rubins concede, exclude coverage.  Then Paylor tells us that we 
can invalidate the exclusion if a specific law or precedent 
requires that result.  Here the general Pennsylvania insurance 
statutes include no such specific law, and there is no judicial 
precedent requiring the invalidation of the exclusion.  
Furthermore, Paylor makes it clear that an exclusion is not to be 
invalidated merely because it will apply only when there are 
family relationships involved in the underlying dispute.  
Finally, Paylor tells us that we should determine whether an 
exclusion must be invalidated to carry out legislative intent.  
But here the Rubins can point to no insurance or consumer 
protection statute which requires the exclusion's invalidation 
and, as we shall demonstrate, the MVFRL, 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 1701 et seq. (Supp. 1994), does not require its invalidation 
either.   
 The cases cited by the district court, Neil v. Allstate 
Ins. Co., 549 A.2d 1304, Paiano v. Home Ins. Co., 385 A.2d 460, 
and Groff v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 646 F. Supp. 973, 
all support our result, as they all conclude that an exclusion 
from liability coverage of claims brought by relatives of the 
insured is valid.  Neil is particularly significant because it 
states that the Hack court noted the existence of family 
  
exclusion clauses "with approval."  549 A.2d at 1307.  Indeed, 
Neil pointed out that family exclusion clauses helped to justify 
the abrogation of the interspousal immunity doctrine as the 
clauses "prevent the possibility of collusive suits."  Id. at 
1308.  While the underlying claim here obviously is legitimate, 
that circumstance does not undermine the validity of the clause 
as written and applied in this case. 
 The Rubins argue that the excess policy is governed by 
the MVFRL and that, therefore, we cannot exclude coverage under 
it for an interspousal claim.  We reject this argument.  While it 
is true that the "general rule in Pennsylvania . . . [is that] 
family car exclusions . . . are invalid as against the policy of 
the" MVFRL, Sherwood v. Bankers Standard Ins. Co., 621 A.2d 1015, 
1017 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993), no Pennsylvania court of which we are 
aware has held that an excess policy is subject to the MVFRL.   
 Furthermore, we believe that the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court would not hold that an excess policy is subject to the 
MVFRL.  The MVFRL provides that "[e]very motor vehicle of the 
type required to be registered under this title which is operated 
or currently registered shall be covered by financial 
responsibility."  75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1786(a).  "Financial 
responsibility" is the "ability to respond in damages for 
liability on account of accidents arising out of the maintenance 
or use of a motor vehicle in the amount of $15,000 because of 
injury to one person in any one accident, in the amount of 
$30,000 because of injury to two or more persons in any one 
accident and in the amount of $5,000 because of damage to 
  
property of others in any one accident."  Id. § 1702.  See 
Worldwide Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Brady, 973 F.2d 192, 193-94 
(3d Cir. 1992).  The MVFRL also provides for a comprehensive 
system of first party benefits, 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1711, 
and for the availability of uninsured and underinsured coverage.  
Id. § 1731. 
 The excess policy in this case simply was not written 
to satisfy the MVFRL.  In fact, inasmuch as the policy required 
Nathan Rubin to carry underlying liability coverage, it is clear 
that the excess policy contemplated that Nathan Rubin have some 
other policy to satisfy the MVFRL.  See O'Hanlon v. Hartford 
Accident and Indem. Co., 639 F.2d 1019, 1027 (3d Cir. 1981).  In 
these circumstances, we find nothing in the MVFRL to support the 
Rubins' claim that the excess policy had to be written with 
liability coverage conforming to the MVFRL's requirements.  See 
Stoumen v. Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 834 F. Supp. 140.  See 
also O'Hanlon v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 639 F.2d at 
1027 (Delaware law). 
 The Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New 
Jersey recently dealt with a claim analogous to the Rubins' in 
Weitz v. Allstate Ins. Co., 642 A.2d 1040 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1994).  In Weitz, a wife brought an action against her 
husband for bodily injuries arising out of an automobile 
accident.  In addition to having a primary automobile liability 
insurance policy, her husband was the named insured in an excess 
policy issued by Allstate Insurance Company.  Consequently, the 
wife then filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a judgment 
  
requiring Allstate to cover her husband for any damages she 
suffered in excess of his primary policy coverage.  Allstate 
disputed liability because the policy did not apply to a personal 
injury to an "insured," and the wife was an "insured," as that 
term included relatives living in the named insured's household.  
The trial court ruled in favor of Allstate, as it held that the 
policy was clear and no statute required that there be coverage.  
Furthermore, it held that public policy did not require coverage. 
 On the wife's appeal, she contended that because under 
the New Jersey No Fault Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:6A-3 (West 
1990), her husband's "primary automobile insurance policy could 
not have excluded coverage for claims brought by members of his 
household . . . he would reasonably assume that his personal 
umbrella policy could not have contained such a exclusion."  642 
A.2d at 1041.  The Appellate Division rejected that argument 
holding: 
 The Legislature has not required automobile 
insureds to purchase umbrella policies; and 
there is no legislation dictating the 
parameters of coverage contained in such 
policies.  Unlike his underlying automobile 
policy whose scope is defined by statute, Mr. 
Weitz's umbrella policy is defined by the 
policy's plain language, unencumbered by the 
statutory requirements for automobile 
insurance.  Plaintiff suggests no compelling 
reason to tack onto one form of insurance the 
statutory requirements governing another.  
 . . .  The unambiguous exclusion set forth in 
Allstate's umbrella policy must be enforced 
as written. 
Id. at 1041-42. 
  
 The situation here with respect to the MVFRL is no 
different from that in Weitz with respect to New Jersey statutory 
law.  In Pennsylvania, as in New Jersey, basic automobile 
insurance coverage is required by law and the terms of the 
policies are regulated highly.  But neither state requires that 
an insured carry an excess policy, and neither specifies the 
scope of coverage for an excess policy.  In these circumstances, 
we conclude, consistently with the Appellate Division's opinion 
in Weitz under New Jersey law, that Pennsylvania law does not 
provide for the application of the MVFRL to Nathan Rubin's excess 
policy. 
 The Rubins also argue that inasmuch as the application 
which Nathan Rubin signed did not include the exclusion, Electric 
unilaterally altered the contract by inserting the exclusion into 
the contract.  They thus contend that they are not bound by the 
exclusion.  We reject this contention.   
 The application was an uncomplicated two-page form 
which hardly could have been understood to include all the terms 
and conditions of the policy to be issued.  With respect to 
automobile coverage, the application simply indicated that the 
insured was required to have underlying liability limits of 
$100,000/300,000 for bodily injury and $10,000 for property 
damage or a $300,000 single-limit policy.  But the application 
did not deal with matters usually contained in a policy with 
respect to scope of coverage, such as the exclusion of liability 
if the insured by his acts intended to cause the injury.  Indeed, 
under the Rubins' argument, the small premium that Nathan Rubin 
  
paid even would have purchased coverage for use of his automobile 
as a taxicab, a recognized high risk which an insured could not 
expect to be covered at the same premium charged for a privately 
used automobile.  Furthermore, the application did not address 
procedural matters such as the insured's duty to notify the 
company when there was an injury or occurrence likely to involve 
coverage under the policy.  Thus, the application Nathan Rubin 
signed merely was a binder which contemplated that the terms and 
conditions of the insurance coverage would appear in the actual 
policy.  See Terry v. Mongin Ins. Agency, 314 N.W.2d 349, 352 
(Wisc. 1982); Di Santo v. Enstrom Helicopter Corp., 489 F. Supp. 
1352, 1358 (E.D. Pa. 1980) ("final policy may be lengthy, 
containing limitations, conditions, and exclusions which cannot 
be stated in a telex message (or a short memorandum)"). 
 We hasten to add two caveats to our conclusion that the 
incomplete application could not trump the terms of the policy.  
First, we recognize, as did the district court, that the Rubins' 
argument would have been stronger if the accident had occurred 
before the first policy had been issued.  Cf. Collister v. 
Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 388 A.2d 1346 (Pa. 1978) (when insured 
applied for life insurance and paid a premium for two months in 
advance and was killed during that period before company issued 
policy, there was coverage even though insured had not obtained 
medical examination required by the application and the receipt 
for it before coverage was to be effective), cert. denied, 439 
U.S. 1089, 99 S.Ct. 871 (1979).  Here, however, the policy was 
issued and then renewed three times before the accident.  
  
Therefore Nathan Rubin had an adequate opportunity to read the 
terms and conditions of the policy.  Second, the exclusion did 
not vary an express term of the application.  Thus, the permanent 
policy did not increase the required limits for the underlying 
coverage over those specified in the application.  Consequently, 
Nathan Rubin cannot say reasonably that he applied for one thing 
but received something else.2  In these circumstances, there is 
no reason why the parties' rights and obligations should not be 
determined under the policy rather than the application. 
 
 III.  CONCLUSION 
 In view of the aforesaid, we will affirm the order of 
February 18, 1994. 
                 
                     
2
.  The Rubins make the following additional arguments:  that the 
policy is unconscionable under Worldwide Underwriters Ins. Co. v. 
Brady, 973 F.2d 192; Electric acted in bad faith contrary to 42 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8371 (Supp. 1994); Electric violated 
additional sections of the Unfair Insurance Practices Act, 40 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1171.5(a)(1)(i), (2) and (10)(vi); and  
Electric violated the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer 
Protection Law, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73, § 201-1 (1993).  We have 
examined these contentions and find them without merit. 
